This paper deals with the enforcement of merger policy, and aims to study how merger remedies a¤ect the deterrence accomplished by controlling mergers. We determine the optimal frequency of investigations launched by the agency, and identify situations where the introduction of remedies can lead to a lower welfare. We …nd that the potential for remedies can make it less likely that the worst mergers are deterred. Even if the worst mergers are deterred, the potential for remedies can lead to more mergers with a negative impact to be proposed, and eventually to more decision errors by the antitrust authorities.
Introduction
In many countries we observe a quite active merger control. However, an outright ban of a merger is rather seldom the action taken by the antitrust authorities. Instead we see that the antitrust authorities quite often require that the merging parties modify the merger, either through structural remedies (for example divestiture of assets) or behavioral remedies (for example speci…c contractual arrangements). 1 Unfortunately, most theoretical studies of merger control do not allow for remedies. The purpose of this article is to help …ll this gap in the literature. We investigate the welfare e¤ect of introducing merger remedies in the presence of possible mistakes by the antitrust authorities and possible deterrence e¤ects of merger control. It is found that an introduction of merger remedies can make it less likely that the worst mergers are deterred, and that allowing for remedies might lead to lower welfare even if the worst mergers are deterred.
Introducing remedies as an option might signal a 'soft' merger policy and thereby encourage …rms to merge. 2 There are empirical studies that investigate how remedies impact the number of proposed mergers. Seldeslachts et al. (2009) use cross-section data from 28 countries of the number of mergers (frequency) and conclude that prohibition decisions deter, whereas conditional approvals through the application of merger remedies do not. Clougherty and Seldeslachts (2013) look at US merger deterrence using a similar method. They examine composition-based and frequency-based deterrence in the US, and …nd that launching an investigation and challenging a merger have signi…cant deterrent e¤ects, but prohibitions do not signi…cantly involve more deterrence than remedies.
Even if the empirical studies do help us understand how allowing for remedies may a¤ect the number of proposed mergers, they do not help us to understand the welfare e¤ect of 1 Leveque and Shelanski (2003) provide an overview of the use of merger remedies in the US and EU. For a more recent review of the use of merger remedies in EU, see Motta et al. (2007) . 2 According to Neven et al. (1993, p.7) "lawyers in particular are aware that this may give them signi…cant bargaining power with the (European) Commission even in doubtful cases". Note that this clearly goes against the original expectation about the possibility of a remedial action -according to Baer and Redcay (2003) , the requirement to …le a pre-merger noti…cation and wait pending the agency's review was reckoned to increase the negotiation power of the agency, because an eventual litigation over the remedy involved supplementary delay, so …rms were expected to become more inclined to accept the settlement terms requested by the agency. 2 remedies. 3 Could it be that consumers would be better o¤ without remedies as a policy alternative? To pinpoint the mechanisms at play, we apply a theoretical model. We allow for both type I and type II errors by antitrust authorities, as well as the potential for deterrence of mergers. As a benchmark we follow Sørgard (2009) , and let the antitrust authorities either ban or clear any merger (remedy is not an option). It is shown that if the quality of merger control is su¢ ciently high, the worst mergers are deterred. However, the merger investigations as such can have a detrimental e¤ect on welfare (enforcement e¤ect). The reason is that those mergers that are investigated are chosen among those that are not deterred. Since the mergers that have the largest anti-competitive e¤ects are already deterred, this leads to a large risk of type I errors (prohibiting welfare enhancing mergers). We complement Sørgard (2009) by allowing for remedies, and comparing the outcome with the benchmark where remedies are not an option. The purpose is to pin down the factors which make remedies welfare-reducing, so as to enable a policy discussion on what the antitrust authorities should bear in mind when allowing for remedies.
It turns out that to address the welfare e¤ect of introducing remedies, it is important to understand (i) how merger remedies will a¤ect the unconditional clearance rate and (ii) the change in pro…ts from unconditional to conditional approval (with remedies). At one extreme, all conditional clearances are replacing unconditional clearances that are present in a no-remedy regime, and at the other extreme all conditional clearances are replacing bans that would be present in the no remedy regime. If most of the remedies are replacing unconditional bans that would be present in a no-remedy regime, and the pro…t from clearance with remedies is close to the pro…t with unconditional clearance, then it is obvious that introducing remedies as an option will make mergers in general more pro…table for the …rms.
For a given activity level by the agency, this will lead to more mergers being proposed.
We show that introducing remedies as an option can make it more di¢ cult to deter the worst mergers, those that are most detrimental to welfare. If the …rms know that remedies 3 Assessing the overall impact of merger control requires to assess both the magnitude of type I and II errors (banning pro-competitive mergers and clearing anticompetitive ones, respectively) and the degree of deterrence achieved. While the former may be easier to capture (see for instance Duso et al. (2007) for an estimation in the European Commission's case), the latter is hard to measure, although the academic literature agrees on the necessity to take it into account (see for instance Joskow (2002) , Crandall and Whinston (2003) and Baker (2003) ).
would be an option they have more incentives to propose the worst mergers, because there is a chance that they may be cleared with remedies. It might be that introducing remedies tips the balance, and suddenly some of the worst mergers are proposed. Then it is obvious that the overall e¤ect of allowing for remedies is probably negative.
If the agency enjoys a su¢ ciently high quality for its merger control activity, it will succeed in deterring the worst mergers even if the conditional approval is allowed for. However, it is still a question how active the agency should be, and for this the agency has to take into account both the enforcement and the deterrence e¤ect. We show the introduction of remedies as an option will modify both the enforcement and the deterrence e¤ect. However, given that the last merger to be deterred is detrimental to welfare, then the deterrence e¤ect is positive and the enforcement e¤ect (given su¢ ciently low marginal costs) is negative. This is true even if we allow for remedies, simply because it is bene…cial for society to deter a merger that would have had a negative impact on welfare and could be cleared -either unconditionally or with remedies -if it had been proposed.
Again, allowing for remedies may have a negative impact on welfare. Although the worst mergers are deterred, allowing for remedies might lead to more mergers being proposed and then less deterrence on the margin for a given activity level by the agency. Also in this case it is of importance how the introduction of remedies will a¤ect the unconditional clearance rate of mergers. If there is only a limited reduction in the rate of unconditional clearance, then it is likely that more mergers are proposed and thereby fewer mergers with a negative impact of welfare are deterred. On the other hand, the introduction of remedies will have an ambiguous e¤ect on the enforcement. Some bene…cial mergers that initially would have been banned will now be cleared with remedies, while some bene…cial mergers that would have been cleared unconditionally are now solved with remedies.
Finally, we discuss the agency's optimal activity level. Again, it is found that the change in the unconditional clearance rate following the introduction of remedies as an option is crucial.
If the unconditional clearance rate drops only marginally, that would encourage more …rms to merge. If the worst mergers are deterred initially, then this makes it more likely that the activity level is higher after the introduction of a merger remedy option. We show that the change in the unconditional clearance rate must be compared with the di¤erence in welfare between clearing mergers unconditionally and clearing them with remedies. When considering to launch one more merger investigation after allowing for merger remedies, we show that it is crucial how large e¤ect the marginal investigation has on the number of additionally deterred merger in a no-remedy regime versus a regime with remedies.
Although merger remedies are widely used by competition authorities, there are only a limited number of theoretical studies of this policy instrument. These studies are typically considering structural remedies, where the merging parties are forced to sell out assets or brands. They …nd that introducing remedies might lead to lower consumer welfare. 4 In contrast to those studies, we allow for type I and type II errors in addition to the possible deterrence e¤ect of merger control. 5 This allows us to investigate how an active merger control will have both a direct e¤ect (on enforcement) and an indirect e¤ect (on deterrence), and how remedies will in ‡uence the trade-o¤ between the direct and indirect e¤ects.
In the next section we present our basic model. In section 3 we identify the conditions ensuring that the most harmful mergers are actually abandoned. For the rest of the paper we assume that the worst mergers are deterred. In section 4 we analyze the trade-o¤ between the enforcement and the deterrence e¤ect, then section 5 identi…es the optimal activity level for the antitrust authorities with and without remedies. The …nal section provides some concluding remarks, and relates to the empirical …ndings in the existing literature.
Basic assumptions and notations
Consider the set of potential pro…table mergers of an economy, denoted Y . A given project y 2 Y may be more or less detrimental to welfare, so one can rank them according to their 4 Cabral (2003) shows that any divestiture to an entrant may lead to lower consumer welfare, because the entrant then might be prevented from introducing its own brand (which in the retail market can be interpreted as a new store). Vergé (2010) applies a Cournot model, and shows that reallocation of assets to existing rivals through remedies is detrimental to consumer welfare unless there are su¢ ciently large synergies. Vasconcelos (2010) also applies a Cournot model, and shows that the potential for remedies can in ‡uence which mergers are proposed and in some cases lead to lower consumer welfare. 5 Cosnita-Langlais and Tropeano (2012) also allow for decision errors due to asymmetric information, but instead focus on how the potential for remedies will in ‡uence the merging …rms'incentives to invest in e¢ ciency gains. See also Seldeslacht et al. (2010) , that also allow for private information. In contrast to us, in the latter model they assume that antitrust authorities are better informed about the e¤ect of the merger than the merging parties.
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welfare e¤ect from 0, the least anticompetitive one, to y, the most anticompetitive one.
Denote W M (y) the net welfare impact of merger y, where W M is decreasing in y, and call y 0 the "neutral" merger, i.e. such that W M (y 0 ) = 0. Then W M (0) > 0 and W M (y) < 0 as long as y 0 2 (0; y).
As before mentioned, we only consider privately pro…table mergers, meaning in the absence of any merger control. Denote M (y) the joint pro…t from merger. In order to merge, the …rms need to incur a …xed sunk cost C, the same for all, where M (y) > C; 8y:
The competition agency (CA henceforth) conducts merger control with probability N 2 [0; 1], which stands for the probability of investigating any given merger y. Normalize the cost of merger enforcement to zero. If investigated, the merger project may be either cleared or banned. We assume that a ban has a zero welfare impact. The decision to clear a merger however may be of two types: unconditional or subject to remedies. As a result, we are going to consider and compare throughout the paper two possible regimes, the "strict" one, not allowing for remedies, and the "remedy" regime, in which the merger approval may involve remedies.
Thus, let g S denote the probability of approval following investigation in the "strict", noremedy regime. As a result, a merger will be banned with probability 1 g S . Furthermore, let g S = g + h, where g stands for the unconditional approval probability and h stands for the probability of clearing the merger subject to remedies in the so-called "remedy" regime. Let us assume from now on that 2 [0; 1] : Thus, g S = g for = 0, i.e. the probability of clearance is the same, regardless of the possibility of remedies, but g S = g + h for = 1, i.e. some "former" approvals become conditional clearances when remedies are used. In other words,
measures to what extent the di¤erence in unconditional approval rates between the two possible regimes is due to the presence of conditional clearances. Finally, let g S ; g and h be all strictly decreasing in y: the more anti-competitive a merger, the less likely the clearance decision, be it unconditional or not.
As compared with the unconditional approval, the conditional clearance leads to di¤erent pro…t and welfare e¤ects. Let R (y) denote the joint pro…t from merger when remedies apply, with R M ; 8y. In other words, we assume that the remedies are costly for the merging …rms. The net welfare e¤ect when the merger is conditionally accepted will be denoted W R (y). As for W M (y), we assume that W R (y) is decreasing in y.
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The timing of actions will be the following:
Stage 1: the Competition Agency (CA) determines the probability N of launching an investigation.
Stage 2: the merging …rms (or insiders) decide whether to merge or not.
Stage 3: the CA investigates submitted mergers and each investigated merger is cleared (possibly under conditions) or banned. Merger control is imperfect: the CA makes both types of errors. 6 The game will be solved by backward induction. The paper aims to compare the outcomes of the merger policies allowing or not for remedies.
Impact of remedies on merger pro…tability and incentives
Given the exogenous probability to clear a merger, conditionally or not, we start by looking into the outcome of the …rms'decision at the second stage. The insiders will merge only if it is pro…table to do so, i.e. if the expected pro…t is positive given the cost of merging and the probability to see their merger banned.
In the "strict", no-remedies regime, the expected pro…t writes:
where the square bracket stands for the total probability to see the merger materialize, i.e.
of not being investigated (1 N ) or of being cleared if investigated (N g S ).
In contrast, the merger policy allowing for remedies leads to an expected pro…t of:
where the square bracket stands for the total probability to see the merger materialize under the exact form that it was submitted, and the term N h(y) stands for the probability of conditional approval in case of investigation.
Comparing the two above expressions enables us to establish the impact of remedies on the merger pro…tability, and hence on the private decision to merge:
Proposition 1 Allowing for remedies increases expected merger pro…tability i¤
Proof. Recall that g S = g + h.
The condition identi…ed in Proposition 1 may be rewritten as
; or, equiva-
In other words, the pro…tability of mergers and the incentive to submit them increase when remedies are possible as long as the relative ratio between net unconditional and conditional approval rates is lower than the relative pro…t ratio between the remedy and the strict regimes, or, equivalently, the pro…t from merger weighted by the net probability of approval is higher with rather than without remedies.
Note that if there is no change in the probability of an unconditional clearance ( = 0), then those mergers that would have been cleared with remedies will be banned. Then it is no surprise that as long as the increase in the probability of a clearance is su¢ ciently low, abolishing remedies will make a merger less pro…table. Note also that the larger the pro…t with remedies relative to that from an unconditional approval, the less likely that the scenario with no remedies would make mergers more pro…table.
Two additional conclusions may be drawn from the expected pro…tability comparison between the two merger policy regimes, with and without remedies.
On the one hand, for a given number of merger investigations, it is straightforward to see that allowing for remedies may trigger more mergers being submitted. Denote y (N ) and y (N ) the "critical" or "marginal" mergers in the "strict" and the "remedy" regimes respectively, i.e. y (N ) such that E S (y ; N ) = 0 and y (N ) such that E R (y ; N ) = 0.
Then for a given N , y (N ) ? y (N ) as long as
? .
On the other hand, one may equally draw a comparison of the CA's activity ensuring the same number of mergers being submitted in the two regimes (i.e. compare N S and N R such that y (N S ) = y (N R )):
as the activity level leading to y in the strict, no-remedy regime.
-let now y (N R ) be such that
is the agency's investigation frequency leading to y in the merger policy regime allowing for remedies.
Assuming that y = y , one gets that
. Summing up yields the following:
, then:
, for a given N : the remedy regime leads to more mergers being submitted for a given level of activity on behalf of the CA;
(ii) N R > N S if y = y : in order to keep constant the number of mergers being submitted, the CA must be "more active"/investigate more often when remedies are possible.
Merger deterrence when remedies apply
Following the above discussion it is clear that when facing a non-zero probability of investigation, some merger projects will not be submitted by the …rms because they expect a ban. The question we tackle now is precisely which merger projects will be thus deterred.
For this, one needs to consider how the expected pro…t from merger depends on the merger type y.
Consider the "strict", no-remedy regime. The worst, most anticompetitive mergers will not be submitted if
we can interpret as follows: the relative pro…t increase from submitting a more anticompetitive merger (the LHS term) must be lower than the relative change in the probability to see the merger accepted (the RHS term). This leads to the Proposition 1 in Sørgard (2009), according to which in the strict, no-remedy regime, under the assumption that mergers with a larger negative welfare impact face a higher probability of ban ( @g S @y < 0), a su¢ cient condition for the "right deterrence" to occur, i.e. the worst mergers not being submitted, is that
In other words, as long as the screening performed by the agency is good enough (i.e.
the more anticompetitive the merger, the higher the likelihood of a ban), then the right deterrence is achieved as soon as there is a negative relationship between the merger's type y and its pro…t (meaning that the more pro-competitive the merger, the more pro…table it is).
In short, as long as the worst mergers have lower chances of approval, they will be deterred if they are also relatively less pro…table. As emphasized by Sørgard (2009) , empirical studies do not necessarily support this negative relationship, but the important conclusion to reach is that the quality or performance of merger control depends on which merger projects are actually deterred.
The possibility of a conditional approval is likely to impact on the factors enabling the "right" deterrence, and we discuss this next.
Proposition 2 When allowing for remedies, the "right" deterrence obtains, i.e. the most welfare-detrimental mergers are abandoned, if
As long as mergers with a larger negative welfare impact face a higher probability of ban, a su¢ cient condition for the "right" deterrence is that
Proof. Under the remedy regime, the worst mergers will be deterred if @y < 0 as well. In short, it all comes down to the same negative relationship between the merger type and its pro…t, but extended to take into account the pro…t made in case of conditional approval.
Let us now …nally compare the conditions ensuring the "right" deterrence between the two merger policy regimes:
under the strict, no-remedy regime, it writes
whereas when remedies are possible it writes
It is easy to see the su¢ cient condition for the latter, One way to interpret Corollary 2 is to say that under the previously identi…ed su¢ cient conditions, giving up remedies is not costly in terms of achieving the "right" deterrence.
However, this tells nothing about the welfare impact of switching from one merger policy regime to the other, and this is what we tackle next.
Impact of remedies on welfare
At the …rst stage of the game, the CA determines its activity level or frequency of investigation N by maximizing its objective function. Let us detail below the expression of the CA's objective in each regime.
In the "strict", no-remedy regime, the CA maximizes an expected welfare equal to: 7
The integral stands for what may be termed as a direct gain from enforcing the merger policy, namely the welfare e¤ect from both mergers that are submitted and not investigated and those that are investigated and cleared. 8 When remedies are allowed, the CA's objective becomes:
The interpretation of the two integrals is roughly the same, except that part of the direct welfare gain from enforcing the merger policy (the …rst term) comes now from the merger projects that are conditionally cleared when investigated. This possibility also modi…es the marginally deterred merger (hence y instead of y ).
Welfare comparison between the two regimes 7 Remember that we assume that a ban has a zero welfare impact. 8 Note that we can leave out from the social welfare function a second integral, Before discussing the maximization and its outcome as such, the mere comparison of the CA's objective function in the two possible regimes provides some interesting insights:
Lemma 1 Assume that the same number of mergers are submitted in both regimes, i.e.
Then for y = y it is straightforward to see that
In other words, in the case of equal deterrence, Lemma 1 states that the expected welfare comparison between both regimes simply comes down to the comparison between
and the relative welfare threshold
W M , or equivalently, between the ratio of net unconditional/conditional approval rates and the ratio of relative social gain from merger.
In particular, the possibility of remedies lowers the expected welfare i¤ the social gain from merger weighted by the net probability of clearance is higher under the strict regime
. This is quite intuitive: given the assumption of equal number of mergers submitted under both regimes, the di¤erence between the two expected welfare functions only comes from the change in approval rates, or more precisely, the transformation of unconditional into conditional clearances for part of the submitted mergers.
So as soon as the welfare change from this can be signed, the expected welfare comparison is straightforward.
The same comparison of objective functions between the two regimes may be further exploited to obtain the following:
Proof. Recall that ? R M , y (N ) 7 y (N ) for a given N , and in this case
and for this a su¢ cient condition is ? 5 Impact of remedies on the optimal activity level
Enforcement and deterrence e¤ects
In the case of the "strict", no-remedy regime, the maximization of the CA's objective function requires a FOC that writes as follows:
The optimal choice N in terms of activity level (or frequency of investigation) for the The equilibrium is met when the last deterred merger is detrimental to welfare, W M (y ) < 0, leading to a positive deterrence e¤ect and a negative enforcement e¤ect 9 in equilibrium.
When allowing for remedies, the FOC on the CA's objective function writes as follows:
It is easy to note that when allowing for remedies, both the enforcement and the deterrence e¤ects are a¤ected. Part of the enforcement e¤ect is now due to the welfare impact of a conditional approval instead of an unconditional approval (the term
while part of the deterrence e¤ect comes now from the welfare impact of some mergers being abandoned although the conditional approval was available (the term N h(y )W R (y ) dy dN ). The CA's optimal choice of an activity level when remedies are available, N , will obviously depend on the sign of the two above-mentioned e¤ects. The latter are in turn determined by the characteristics of the last merger to be submitted/deterred. Thus the following result holds:
Lemma 3 Assume the "right" deterrence under the remedies regime. Then 9!N 2 (0; 1) i¤ the enforcement and the deterrence e¤ ect have opposite signs in equilibrium. In particular:
(i) a su¢ cient condition for the enforcement e¤ ect to be negative and the deterrence e¤ ect to be positive in equilibrium is that the last merger to be deterred is detrimental, with 9 The latter stays negative as long as the marginal cost of investigations is su¢ ciently low.
or without remedies;
(ii) a su¢ cient condition for the enforcement e¤ ect to be positive and the deterrence e¤ ect to be negative in equilibrium is that the last merger to be deterred is welfare-improving, with or without remedies.
Proof. Merger pro…tability is decreasing in N , so from the expected pro…t function E R (y) one can easily derive that the "right" deterrence, i.e. @E R (y) @y < 0, implies dy dN < 0: Thus the …rst part of Lemma 3 is trivial to derive from (6) . Rewriting the latter as follows:
A su¢ cient condition for signing the enforcement e¤ect in equilibrium, and thereby the deterrence e¤ect as well, is that signW M (y ) = signW R (y ).
According to point (i) of Lemma 3, as long as the "right" deterrence is achieved by investigating mergers, the deterrence e¤ect when remedies are available is positive in equilibrium i¤
It is straightforward to see that a su¢ -cient condition for the deterrence e¤ect to be positive is that W M (y ) < 0 and W R (y ) < 0, meaning the last deterred merger would have been detrimental to welfare if cleared, with or without remedies. In this case, given the normalization of the marginal investigation cost to zero, the enforcement e¤ect is negative in equilibrium -thus we provide here an extension of Sørgard (2009) to the case of conditional approvals.
The detailed expression of the enforcement e¤ect re ‡ects the trade-o¤ leading to an interior solution in terms of merger investigation rate when W M (y ) < 0 and W R (y ) < 0:
where y 0 is such that W M (y 0 ) = 0 and y 00 is such that W R (y 00 ) = 0. A negative enforcement e¤ect is due to the substantial wrongful bans ( To see the intuition for this, it is useful to recall that when remedies are available, the enforcement e¤ect is the sum of the welfare e¤ects from bans and conditional approvals that take place instead of unconditional clearings. Therefore, despite the fact that these bans are now clearly type I errors, they are nonetheless compensated by the welfare gain from conditional approvals, since all submitted mergers to the last are welfare-improving if conditionally accepted. Equivalently, the deterrence e¤ect is negative in equilibrium, because increasing marginally the frequency of investigation will trigger even more mergers to be abandoned, although they could have been conditionally cleared and thereby increase welfare (since W R (y ) > 0).
It is thus important to note that the remedy regime modi…es the composition of both the enforcement and deterrence e¤ects as compared with the strict, no-remedy regime. Incidentally, this enables a more complete de…nition of the CA's optimal activity level. The mere fact that conditional approvals are available indicates that the CA's decision errors also apply to them: some mergers are deterred although they might have been conditionally cleared, whereas other mergers are no longer banned but conditionally approved. The welfare impact of these decisions now enters the CA's trade-o¤, and Lemma 3 identi…es two polar cases that are compatible with an interior solution in terms of the CA's optimal activity level.
The most important remark deals however with the interpretation of the two cases, (i) 1 0 Alternatively, the intuition is easy to grasp by considering the limit case where W R (y ) = 0. In that case a remedy will …x the harm for the marginal merger, which will therefore imply for it a zero impact on welfare.
The resulting situation is analogous to Sørgard (2009) : the conditional approval will have exactly the same deterrence e¤ect on welfare as a ban, and thus the last merger being deterred leads to a welfare improvement because it is a detrimental merger.
and (ii). Consider for instance the "neutral" merger de…ned by W M (y 0 ) = 0. Then case (i), where W M (y ) < 0, corresponds to all mergers y y being submitted, although part of them are welfare-decreasing (y 0 y < y ). In other words, not all submitted mergers are welfare-improving, but all the deterred mergers were welfare-decreasing, and therefore the CA's optimal activity level N is compatible with under-deterrence, to the extent the imperfect merger screening allows some of the anti-competitive mergers to be submitted.
In turn, case (ii), for which W M (y ) > 0, has all the mergers such that y 2 (y ; y 0 ] abandoned. Therefore all submitted mergers are welfare-improving, but all deterred mergers
were not welfare-decreasing. The CA's optimal activity level N is now compatible with over-deterrence, since the imperfect merger screening deters some welfare-improving mergers.
At any rate, and as before mentioned, the possibility of a conditional approval modi…es both sides of the trade-o¤ that the CA faces, i.e. the enforcement and the deterrence e¤ects.
As a result, it is likely that the optimal choice of an activity level will di¤er between the two regimes.
Comparing the optimal activity levels assuming equal deterrence between regimes
Let us for the time being assume that the same number of mergers is submitted in both regimes. For the sake of the comparison between the two FOCs, let us rewrite below the one in the case of the "strict", no-remedy regimes, by using g S = g + h:
Then, based on (6) and (7), the following holds:
Proof. Denote the di¤erence between the two FOCs when y (N ) = y (N ). Then In other words, we have identi…ed a su¢ cient condition to rank the CA's optimal activity levels with and without remedies available, provided that the same deterrence is achieved under both regimes. According to Lemma 4, this su¢ cient condition is, again, the comparison between , the change rate from net unconditional approvals into conditional ones, and the relative welfare ratio
To grasp the intuition, it is useful to follow the proof and recall that the comparison of optimal activity levels between the two regimes results from that of the …rst order conditions on the respective expected welfare functions. Leaving aside the di¤erence in the number of mergers submitted under each regime, expressions (6) and (7) di¤er in as much as part of the enforcement e¤ect is due to the welfare impact of mergers no longer banned but conditionally accepted, W M (y) ? W R (y), and by the same token, part of the deterrence e¤ect is due to those mergers that are abandoned but might have been conditionally, instead of unconditionally, cleared (W R (y ) ? W M (y )). When both regimes yield the same expected pro…tability for merger projects, i.e. y = y , the remaining relevant comparison is the one between the welfare gains from merger, weighted by the respective net approval rates:
Finally, taking into account both Lemma 1 and Lemma 4, the following obtains:
Corollary 3 Assume that the same number of mergers is submitted under both regimes. I¤ ?
Equivalently, in the particular case of identical expected merger pro…tability (y = y ),
following Proposition 1 and the discussion preceding Corollary 1, the sign of the di¤erence between the relative increases in pro…ts and welfare levels respectively
? 0) directly indicates the ranking of the optimal activity levels for the CA and the resulting expected welfare levels as well. The intuition is simple: recall that identical expected merger pro…tability also means identical deterrence, and therefore the relative gain from enforcing a given regime only comes from minimizing the type II errors, or false approvals. This explains the direct relationship between the optimal activity level and the expected welfare (N ? N and E S W ? E R W as well): a more intense control activity prevents more anticompetitive mergers and thereby yields a higher welfare.
A full- ‡edged comparison of optimal investigation frequencies
However, for a general comparison of the optimal activity levels, it is necessary to relax the assumption of equal deterrence under both regimes. In order to compare the two FOCs when y 6 = y , one may use their monotonicity and consider evaluating one of them at the optimal activity level corresponding to the other regime. For instance, if
then N 7 N . This leads to the following:
Proposition 3 Assume that the most detrimental mergers are deterred. Then:
< 0 is a su¢ cient condition to have N < N ;
(ii) for > See proof in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 provides su¢ cient conditions to rank the optimal activity levels between both merger control regimes when merger investigations deter the most welfare-detrimental merger projects, but the two regimes do not equally deter.
The cases displayed in Proposition 3 di¤er in terms of conditions enabling the comparison of optimal activity levels. The …rst two cases identi…ed correspond to the situations where the private and public incentives due to merger control are each time compatible: higher merger pro…tability and higher social gain from controlling merger for the remedy regime in case (i), and the opposite in case (ii). This lack of con ‡ict between private and public incentives goes along with a unique and quite simple su¢ cient condition for comparing the optimal investigation rates between regimes: the local monotonicity of the deterrence gap, or, alternatively, the impact of an in…nitesimal increase in the investigation frequency on the deterrence or merger pro…tability di¤erential in the vicinity of the optimal activity level of the remedy regime 11 . In turn, the two remaining cases deal with situations where the private and public incentives regarding mergers are not aligned: lower merger pro…tability but higher social welfare from controlling mergers and allowing for remedies in case (iii), and higher merger incentives but lower social gain for the remedy regime in case (iv). In order to compare the optimal investigation rates between regimes, such con ‡icting incentives require a further su¢ cient condition, beyond signing the marginal deterrence gap. Formally, this additional su¢ cient condition deals with the type of the marginal merger in the strict, no-remedy regime, but it basically comes down to the occurrence of either under-or overdeterrence in equilibrium.
Let us provide the intuition for the results displayed in Proposition 3.
Consider case (i): it identi…es the remedy regime as the one where mergers are less deterred in absolute terms ( < R M , y > y ), and also as the regime yielding a higher social gain from controlling mergers ( W M < W R , (g S g)W M < hW R indicates that the merger welfare e¤ect, weighted by the net approval rate, is higher in the remedy regime). As before mentioned, this is a case of aligned incentives, with the remedy regimes being 'preferred'by both the merging …rms and the competition authority. We …nd that the optimal investigation rate will be higher with remedies, N > N ; provided that the marginal deterrence goes the same way as the absolute deterrence ( d(y y ) dN N < 0 means that y diminishes faster than y when one more investigation is launched, indicating a 'slower'deterrence when remedies are available). In other words, the competition agency can a¤ord to conduct a more active merger policy in the remedy regime, given the lower reactivity of …rms to its intervention (i.e. the lower, both absolute and marginal, deterrence, and hence the lower opportunity cost induced), and will optimally choose to do so, since the social gain from controlling mergers is higher.
The same type of argument goes for case (ii), which deals with the symmetrically opposite situation in terms of aligned incentives.
Let us turn now to cases (iii) and (iv), which exhibit in contrast con ‡icting incentives between the …rms and the agency. For instance, in case (iii), the merger pro…tability is lower (or, equivalently, the absolute deterrence is higher), but the social welfare from controlling mergers is higher when remedies are available: 
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(g S g)W M < hW R : We …nd that the CA will optimally be more active in controlling mergers when remedies are allowed, N > N ; provided that the marginal deterrence goes the same way as the absolute deterrence (
> 0 means that y diminishes faster than y when one more investigation is launched, indicating a 'quicker' deterrence when remedies are available), and also provided that the optimal investigation rates induce over-deterrence
The intuition is the following: despite the higher 'reactivity'of …rms when remedies are available (higher absolute and marginal deterrence), the CA will be more active in controlling mergers as compared with the strict, no-remedy regime, because the social gain from its public intervention is higher
. This holds as long as allowing for remedies does not lead to more wrongful approvals, or type II errors:
indicate that the remedy regime 'replicates' the outcome of over-deterrence in equilibrium obtained under the strict regime, meaning that all submitted mergers in equilibrium (i.e. for N and N respectively) are welfare-improving, therefore no type II errors are possible.
In contrast, case (iv) has the CA optimally control fewer mergers in the remedy regime (N > N ) because the gain from its intervention is lower (
hW R indicates that the merger welfare gain, weighted by the net approval rate, is lower in the remedy regime). This holds however whenever the strict regime exhibits higher deterrence, both absolute ( < R M , y > y ), and marginal (
< 0 means that y diminishes faster than y when one more investigation is launched), although the optimal investigation rates actually induce under-deterrence (W M (y ) < 0 leads to W R (y ) < 0; W M (y ) < 0 and W R (y ) < 0 as well). Basically, the under-deterrence outcome indicates that all deterred mergers were welfare-decreasing, but all submitted mergers are not welfare-improving, therefore the imperfect merger control leads to type II errors (wrongful clearances, with or without remedies). As a result, the CA will optimally be less active when allowing for remedies as long as the remedy regime replicates the under-deterrence obtained under the strict regime,
given the lower reactivity of …rms to public intervention and the lower gain obtained from controlling mergers when conditional approvals are possible.
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Concluding remarks
The purpose of this article has been to discuss the possible welfare e¤ects of merger remedies.
We show that allowing for merger remedies has a non-trivial e¤ect on the incentives to merge, the agency's merger control activity level as well as the welfare e¤ect of merger control. it -our analysis indicates that their impact on deterrence might be crucial. First, introducing remedies might imply that some of the worst mergers would suddenly be pro…table to propose.
If so, we are no longer deterring the right mergers. Second, a regime with merger remedies can -as the empirical study indicates -lead to more mergers being proposed. This will lead to less deterrence on the margin, unless there is a su¢ ciently large increase in the agency's merger control activity.
Our analysis has important implications for how we should test empirically the e¤ect of remedies. There are several empirical studies that question the welfare e¤ects of imposing remedies. However, all these studies consider only the enforcement e¤ect -either of behavioral or structural remedies applied in speci…c merger control cases. We point out that this might not capture the potentially most important problem associated with remedies. It might lead to less deterrence of mergers that on the margin are detrimental to welfare, and even a shift in direction of the worst mergers no longer being deterred.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.
Recall that
and that N is such that 
